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PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW
William T. Reisinger *
INTRODUCTION
Over the past fifteen years, Virginia has witnessed numerous
fundamental changes to the regulation of investor-owned electric
utilities in the Commonwealth-from traditional cost-based rate
regulation, to experiments with deregulation, and finally to "re-
regulation" of utilities at the Virginia State Corporation Commis-
sion (the "SCC").' The legislature has also enacted various poli-
cies designed to encourage the construction of new power plants,
energy conservation, and the development of clean energy re-
sources. Almost every annual session of the Virginia General As-
sembly has brought at least one minor change to the Virginia
Electric Utility Regulation Act. This article explains, at a high
level, some of the major changes to electric regulation in Virginia
in recent years. It also discusses how the General Assembly's new
policies have affected retail electric rates and the development of
new generation facilities, including renewable energy resources,
in the Commonwealth since 1999.
I. VIRGINIA'S EXPERIMENT WITH DEREGULATION
Electric utilities, including those in Virginia, have traditionally
been regulated by states pursuant to their police powers.2 In a
* Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia; Distin-
guished Visitor in Natural Resources Law, Appalachian School of Law. Any views ex-
pressed in this article are my own and do not necessarily represent those held by the At-
torney General of Virginia or any other agency or employee of the Commonwealth.
1. When discussing "electric utilities" or "utilities," this article is primarily referring
to the two largest investor-owned electric utilities operating in the Commonwealth: Do-
minion Virginia Power and Appalachian Power Company. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N,
STAFF INVESTIGATION ON THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 1 (2007), avail-
able at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/restrct4.pdf.
2. Evans B. Brasfield, Regulation of Electric Utilities by the State Corporation Com-
mission, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 589, 589 (1973); see Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 122,
126 (1876) (authorizing rate and profit regulation of businesses "affected with a public in-
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traditionally regulated jurisdiction, the rates utilities may charge
its customers, and the profits utilities may retain, are determined
by state public utility commissions.! There are many justifications
for rate and profit regulation. But very simply, rate regulation by
state commissions is intended to simulate competition in indus-
tries where little exists. Typically, states grant electric utilities a
monopoly to sell energy in a particular geographic region.' In ex-
change for this monopoly right, however, utilities must offer ser-
vice to all customers on a non-discriminatory basis and must
submit to rate and profit regulation by state regulators.
In the 1990s, many states began to experiment with the dereg-
ulation of the generation component of electricity, allowing cus-
tomers to choose from whom to buy their power.6 In deregulated
markets, no utility holds a monopoly on the right to sell electrici-
ty, and customers are not required to purchase generation from
an incumbent monopoly utility company.' Instead, customers may
"shop" among various generation providers for the best rates. The
theory supporting deregulation is based on competition.' Advo-
cates of deregulation hope that electric rates will be reduced if
more utilities and non-utility generating companies are allowed
to compete for customers.
terest").
3. See Electric Rates in Virginia: How Are They Determined by the State Corporation
Commission?, VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, http://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/howerates.pdf
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014); see also How Natural Gas Utility Rates Are Set, AM. GAS ASS'N,
http://www.aga.org/our-issues/RatesRegulatorylssues/ratesregpolicy/Training/Pages/How
NaturalGasUtilityRates.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (discussing how rates are set in
the natural gas utility context).
4. See THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE
U.S.: A GUIDE 5 (2011) [hereinafter ELECTRICITY REGULATION GUIDE].
5. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-265.3 to -265.4 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2014). The
exceptions to utilities' exclusive territory right are outlined in section 56-577(A)(5). Id. §
56-577(A)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
6. Electric bills are comprised of several components, including generation, trans-
mission, and distribution costs. "Deregulation" in the energy context refers to allowing
customer choice for purchase of the generation component of electricity. See ELECTRICITY
REGULATION GUIDE, supra note 4, at 8. In deregulated markets, customers may shop for
generation suppliers, but local distribution utilities still own "the wires" and have a mo-
nopoly on the distribution of electricity. See id.
7. Id.
8. See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON ELEC. UTIL. RESTRUCTURING, S. Doc. No. 12, at iii
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 RESTRUCTURING CoMM. REPORT].
9. Whether the deregulation of the generation component of electric services has in
fact resulted in lower prices for consumers is subject to significant debate, but is beyond
the scope of this article.
138 [Vol. 49:137
PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW
A. 1999 Restructuring Act
In the late 1990s Virginia began to experiment with electric de-
regulation.o With the enactment of the Virginia Electric Utility
Restructuring Act (the "Restructuring Act") in 1999, the Virginia
General Assembly established a transition period for deregula-
tion." During the transition period the base rates" of Virginia's
two largest electric utilities, Dominion Virginia Power ("Domin-
ion") and Appalachian Power Company ("APCo"), were frozen or
"capped."" The Restructuring Act sought to encourage competi-
tive providers of energy to enter the market, thus allowing for
competition for retail generation supply." The transition period
was originally scheduled to end on July 1, 2007.'1 At that point,
retail electric customers were to have free choice to purchase
their power from whichever generator offered the best terms." In
other words, incumbent investor-owned electric utilities such as
Dominion and APCo would no longer have a monopoly over the
generation component of electric sales in their service territories.
The Virginia General Assembly's Commission on Electric Utility
Restructuring ("CEUR") described promoting competition as the
''paramount goal" of the Restructuring Act:
The paramount goal of the Restructuring Act is the development of a
competitive retail market-based system for the provision of the gen-
eration component of electric service. The Act envisions a system
where consumers, guided by prices and other market signals, will be
able to select their electricity suppliers from among competing pro-
viders of generation services.'
10. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMM. STUDYING RESTRUCTURING OF THE ELEC. UTIL.
INDUS., S. Doc. No. 34, at 1 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 RESTRUCTURING COMM. REPORT].
11. Act of Mar. 25, 1999, ch. 411, 1999 Va. Acts 478, 480 (currently codified as amend-
ed at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-576 to -595 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2012)); see 1999
RESTRUCTURING COMM. REPORT, supra note 10, at 2-3.
12. Generally, base rates are designed to recover all operating costs of a utility, with
the exception of fuel and purchased power costs as those costs are recovered through sepa-
rate rate riders. Base rates are set at a level that will allow a utility to recover its operat-
ing costs plus a fair rate of return on common equity.
13. See REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE TRANSITION TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED UNDER
THE VA. ELEC. UTIL. RESTRUCTURING ACT, S. Doc. No. 17, at 19-20 (2013).
14. 2004 RESTRUCTURING COMM. REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
15. Id. at 10.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6.
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However, the General Assembly was also aware of the poten-
tial risks associated with deregulation and the Restructuring Act,
namely that sufficient competition would not develop:
As the Commonwealth jettisons the traditional cost-of-service-based
system of regulating the rates charged by electric utilities, however,
the risk exists that competition will not develop to a sufficient extent
such that market forces are an effective means of regulating the
prices that suppliers may charge consumers. The lack of develop-
ment of effective retail competition may result in a scenario where
instead of being served by monopoly providers, whose prices are reg-
ulated based on their cost of service, consumers will be served by un-
regulated monopoly providers that are able to exercise market pow-
er.
In the absence of meaningful competition, and without state
regulation of rates, providers of electricity could conceivably exer-
cise significant market power and charge exorbitant prices.
B. 2004 Senate Bill 651
Indeed, signs of trouble arose even before the expiration of
capped rates. By 2004, sufficient competition for the generation
component of electric generation had not developed, and the Gen-
eral Assembly rightly feared that customers could face drastic
rate increases once rates were unfrozen and left to the free mar-
ket." The CEUR noted that "if competition does not materialize
as expected during the next few years, the [CEUR] will take
whatever steps are necessary to maintain the Commonwealth's
long-standing status as a state with reliable and low-cost electric
service.""
In late 2003, the SCC recommended, in a report to the General
Assembly, that the legislature should consider delaying the im-
plementation of deregulation. 2 1 The SCC noted that "the status of
competition is not encouraging" and that there had been "little
change in market conditions around the country or in Virginia"
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id. at v.
21. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPETITIVE
RETAIL MARKET FOR ELEcTRIc GENERATION WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at
ix (2003), available at https://www.sce.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2003_1.pdf.
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since the passage of the Restructuring Act.22 The SCC also stated
that "retail choice is not yet providing meaningful benefits or
yielding sustained savings anywhere in the country."
In 2004, the General Assembly, recognizing that sufficient
competition for generation had not materialized in Virginia, de-
layed the Commonwealth's transition to retail choice. Senate Bill
651 extended the transition to deregulation to December 31,
2010.24
II. 2007 ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT (VIRGINIA'S "RE-
REGULATION" ACT)
From 2005 to 2007, meaningful competition did not develop in
Virginia.2 1 Meanwhile, market-based generation rates soared in
other Mid-Atlantic states, such as Maryland, that had completed
a transition to retail choice.26 In its 2006 Report to the Governor
and the General Assembly, the SCC explained that "retail compe-
tition has yet to develop especially for smaller consumers" and, as
a result, the SCC "continue[d] to question the ability of retail
electric competition to provide Virginians with lower prices for
electric service than those that would have prevailed under tradi-
,,21tional regulation of the industry. In summary, the SCC noted
that "the right to choose has still not evolved into the ability to
choose."2
22. Id. at xiii.
23. Id.
24. See S.B. 651, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2004) (enacted as Act of Apr. 14, 2004,
ch. 827, 2004 Va. Acts 1268).
25. See id.; VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
COMPETITIVE RETAIL MARKET FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA, at ii-iii (2005) [hereinafter 2005 SCC Report], available at https://www.
scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2005_intro.pdf; Virginia Restructuring Suspended, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/virginia.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
26. Justin Blum, The Power of Rising Energy Prices: Soaring Costs Have Md. Alumi-
num Plant on the Brink, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentfarticle/2005/11/08/AR2005110801551.html.
27. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMPETITIVE
RETAIL MARKET FOR ELECTRIC GENERATION WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at
iv (2006) [hereinafter 2006 SCC REPORT], available at https://www.sce.virginia.gov/comm/
reports/2006-intro.pdf.
28. 2005 SCC REPORT, supra note 25, at iii.
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In 2007, the General Assembly, recognizing the lack of mean-
ingful competition for generation, abandoned the Common-
wealth's transition to deregulation altogether. The legislature en-
acted a comprehensive "re-regulation" act, now referred to as the
Virginia Electric Utility Regulation Act (the "2007 Act").29 The
2007 Act, however, did not return to traditional cost of service-
based regulation, as it existed in Virginia prior to 1999.0 Instead,
the 2007 Act established a novel regulatory system which limited
the SCC's discretion in setting rates that utilities may charge and
establishing their authorized rates of return while at the same
time encouraging utilities to undertake large capital projects that
could be charged to ratepayers through special rate adjustment
clauses." The regulatory system established by the 2007 Act re-
mains largely in effect today, although there have been some no-
table changes to the law, as discussed below.
Virginia's two largest investor-owned electric utilities, Domin-
ion and APCo, are the only utilities subject to the 2007 Act.32 Do-
minion provides service to approximately 2.4 million customers in
Virginia, while APCo serves approximately 500,000 customers in
Southwest and southern Virginia." Kentucky Utilities ("KU"), the
only other investor-owned electric utility operating in the Com-
monwealth, serves approximately 29,000 customers in Southwest
Virginia and is not subject to the 2007 Act by the terms of the
statute.34 KU's rates and rates of return are determined based on
29. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts 2402 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-576 to -594 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2014)); Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 933,
2007 Va. Acts 2614 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-576 to -594 (Repl. Vol.
2012 & Cum. Supp. 2014)).
30. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., RETURN-ON-EQUITY ENHANCEMENT ADDERS OF THE
2007 VA. ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT 1 (2012) [hereinafter AG ROE
ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT].
31. Id. at 3-5.
32. Id. at 1.
33. Id.; see Peter Bacqub, Dominion Va. Power Launches Text Alerts, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (July 22, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/business/economy/dom
inion-va-power-launches-text-alerts/article731be890-8232-5507-aal9-0915958a3705.ht
ml.
34. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRGINIA
ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT 1 n.2 (2011), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/
comm/reports/2011_veur.pdf- About KU, LG&E KU, http://lge-ku.com/our-company/about-
ku (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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traditional rate case principles and pursuant to Chapter 10 of Ti-
tie 56 of the Virginia Code."
A. Biennial Base Rate Review Proceedings
Perhaps the most significant component of the 2007 Act was
the establishment of biennial review base rate proceedings. 36 The
2007 Act requires the SCC to review a utility's non-fuel base rates
in a litigated rate case every two years. Very simply, a utility re-
covers through its base rates, all costs necessary to provide elec-
tric service (with the exception of fuel costs and those costs that
are recovered through special issue rate riders).3 ' Base rates are
also set at a level that will allow the utility to earn a fair rate of
return (i.e., a profit)."
Several issues must be litigated in a biennial review case.
First, the utility's earnings from base rates for the prior two-year
period are reviewed and measured against the last authorized
fair rate of return, which would have been established in the util-
ity's last biennial review proceeding.40 Depending on whether the
utility's earned return was below, above, or within an earnings
band around the authorized return, and in consideration of other
factors, the SCC may increase rates, order rate credits, order rate
reductions, or take no action on rates." Second, the SCC must es-
tablish a new "fair rate of return on [common equity]" ("rate of re-
turn" or "ROE") to benchmark earnings for the next two-year pe-
riod.42 This new authorized rate of return will also be used in
setting new rates prospectively and for any rate adjustment
clauses." To set the fair rate of return, the SCC receives evidence
35. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-232 to -265 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Supp. 2014).
36. See id. § 56-585.1(A)(3) (Supp. 2014).
37. Id. Costs of fuel, such as coal or gas, continue to be recovered through a separate
rate mechanism called the "fuel factor." Id. § 56-249.6(A)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012); AG ROE
ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 2 n.5.
38. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 3 n.10, 5.
39. See id. at 2 & n.6. Whether a utility actually does recover its full costs through
base rates, however, is of course dependent on the amount of electricity sold. If a utility
sells less energy, whether due to mild weather or an economic downturn, the utility bears
the risk of not recouping all the costs that it was authorized to recover through rates.
40. Id. at 2-3.
41. See id. at 2.
42. Id. at 3.
43. Id.
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regarding the utility's market cost of capital, which is the per-
centage return that a theoretical investor would require in order
to invest in the utility and finance its operations.44 After deter-
mining the utility's market cost of capital, the SCC sets the utili-
ty's authorized return.45
Importantly, the 2007 Act significantly constrained the SCC's
discretion in determining a utility's fair rate of return on common
equity. In a traditional rate case, a public utilities commission
would review a utility's projected growth rates, earnings, and
other financial factors, such as expected future interest rates, to
determine the utility's fair rate of return.46 The allowed return
must be fair and "sufficient to enable the [utility] to attract the
necessary capital to carry out its obligation to render service to
the public."47 After determining the utility's authorized rate of re-
turn (i.e., the allowed profit level), the utility may then set its
rates at a level that will allow it to recover its full costs of service
plus the rate of return profit.48 Thus, under traditional ratemak-
ing, and prior to the 2007 Act and the General Assembly's exper-
iment with deregulation, the SCC had the sole discretion to de-
termine what a utility's authorized rate of return should be,
provided that the authorized return was not so low as to consti-
tute an unconstitutional "taking" of the utility's property.4 9
The 2007 Act, however, established a procedure for setting an
"ROE floor" that constrained the SCC's ability to establish a fair
rate of return based on a traditional cost of equity analysis.o For
example, the statute requires the SCC to consider the average
earned-i.e., not merely authorized-returns of a group of "peer
utilities" when setting a rate of return." The peer group floor
guarantees that Dominion and APCo will have their authorized
rates of return set no lower than the actual earned returns, as re-
ported to the Securities and Exchange Commission, of a group of
44. See id. at 3 n.10, 4.
45. See id. at 3-4.
46. See id. at 3.
47. Commonwealth v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 211 Va. 758, 769, 180 S.E.2d 675, 684
(1971) (citing Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)).
48. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
49. See id. (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301-02 (1989)).
50. Id.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A) (Supp. 2014).
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peer utilities in the Southeast.5 2 Thus, if the average of the statu-
torily determined peer utilities rose higher than the market cost
of equity determined by the SCC, then the SCC would be required
to set the rate of return at the higher peer utility average." In a
situation where the peer group floor would require the SCC to set
an ROE higher than it otherwise would have been, the result
would be higher rates for consumers. Indeed, in a 2009 rate case
for APCo, the SCC indicated that the appropriate cost of equity,
and thus the appropriate ROE for rate setting, for APCo was
10%.54 The peer group average, however, was determined to be
higher (10.53%) and thus, the statute required the SCC to set the
ROE higher than it otherwise would have been under traditional
ratemaking. This ROE increase attributable to the statutory
ROE floor resulted in a $7 million increase in APCo's revenue re-
quirement, which translated into a $0.70 increase to the monthly
bill of a residential customer using 1000 kilowatt hours ("kWhs")
per month."
The 2007 Act also prevents the SCC from decreasing a utility's
rates unless the utility has been deemed to have "over-earned" or
exceeded its recovered costs in excess of its authorized revenue
requirement for two consecutive biennial review periods. But
while the 2007 Act contains limitations on rate decreases, there
52. See id.; AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 4.
53. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 4.
54. Application of Appalachian Power Co., For a Statutory Review of the Rates, Terms
and Conditions for the Provision of Generation, Distribution and Transmission Services
Pursuant to the § 56-585.1 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2009-00030, 2010 Va. PUC LEXIS
398, Final Order at *13 (July 15, 2010).
55. Id. at *19; see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
56. Ken Cuccinelli, Another Viewpoint: Ken Cuccinelli: AG Clarifies APCo Info,
MARTINSVILLE BULL. (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.martinsvillebulletin.comlarticle.cfm?ID
=25259; see also VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, ASSESSING THE RATES AND TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF INCUMBENT ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN THE COMMONWEALTH PURSUANT TO
THE SEVENTH ENACTMENT CLAUSE OF CHAPTER 933 (SB 1416) OF THE 2007 ACTS OF
ASSEMBLY 15 (2012), available at https://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2012_IEU
Ch933.pdf ("Based on this ROE [using the statutory floor] and other ratemaking adjust-
ments, the Commission approved an overall base rate increase of approximately $61.5 mil-
lion. This base rate change increased the monthly bill for a residential customer using
1,000 kWh by $5.09, or by approximately 4.9%.").
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(c) (Supp. 2014); see AG ROE ENHANCEMENT
ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 2.
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are no similar limitations on rate increases for customers." A util-
ity may request a rate increase during any biennial review pro-
ceeding."
B. Rate Adjustment Clauses
Another significant change to electric regulation in Virginia
came with the implementation of rate adjustment clauses
("RACs"), sometimes referred to as rate riders or "trackers" in
other jurisdictions." RACs allow utilities to recover certain costs
through special issue rate riders as opposed to through base
rates." This change provided significant benefits for utilities for
several reasons. Most importantly, RACs guarantee recovery of
all expenses included in the RAC." For example, Virginia Code
section 56-585.1(A)(5) currently provides several categories of
rate adjustment clauses, including RACs for the recovery of pow-
er plant construction costs, environmental compliance costs, and
expenses related to the development of new energy efficiency and
demand-side management programs.6 3 Therefore, any SCC-
approved costs that are eligible for recovery through a rate ad-
justment clause are guaranteed to be recovered by the utility,
along with its fair rate of return determined in a base rate case.64
This is in contrast to traditional recovery through base rates
whereby utilities only have the opportunity to recover their full
costs of service, including a fair rate of return.
For example, assume that a Virginia utility incurs a capital ex-
pense of $100 million in order to install pollution control equip-
ment at a coal-fired power plant, and the SCC deemed this ex-
pense necessary and prudent. Assume further that the utility's
58. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(8)-(9) (Supp. 2014).
59. See id. § 56-585.1(A)(8)(a) (Supp. 2014).
60. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 4; see also AARP,
INCREASING USE OF SURCHARGES ON CONSUMER UTILITY BILLS 2-3 (2012) (discussing the
types of "single issue ratemaking," including "surcharges, trackers, riders, and other cost
recovery mechanisms").
61. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(5) (Supp. 2014); see AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS
REPORT, supra note 30, at 4-5.
64. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(5)(e) (Supp. 2014); AG ROE ENHANCEMENT
ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 5.
65. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 3-5.
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ROE was determined to be 10%. Under the current scheme, Vir-
ginia law allows a utility to recover its "actual costs" necessary to
comply with environmental laws and regulations through a
RAC." This means that the utility would be guaranteed to recover
every cent of the $100 million expense, plus an ROE of 10%. The
RAC would also be updated on an annual basis, allowing the util-
ity to "true-up" its costs and revenues, thus guaranteeing full re-
covery, plus an ROE of all environmental compliance expenses.
Prior to the RAC provisions of the 2007 Act, utilities were re-
quired to seek recovery of all non-fuel expenses through base
rates.8 Importantly, under traditional ratemaking, utilities are
not guaranteed to recover costs through base rates.6 9 Instead,
they only have the opportunity to recover their costs.7o In the ex-
ample above, under traditional ratemaking principles, the SCC
might authorize a Virginia utility to recover $100 million in pru-
dently incurred environmental compliance costs. The utility
would be allowed to set its rates at a level that would allow it to
recover these costs based on forecasted electric sales. Whether the
utility did in fact recover those costs through rates, however,
would depend on how many kWhs it sold. If the utility sold fewer
kWhs than it expected, due to mild weather or economic factors,
the utility might not fully recover its costs plus its authorized
rate of return. This risk of under-recovery is eliminated with
RACs.7 The RACs authorized by the 2007 Act thus shift signifi-
cant financial risks from a utility's shareholders to its ratepayers.
RACs also benefit utilities for other reasons. The RACs estab-
lished by the 2007 Act allow utilities to receive "timely and cur-
rent recovery" of costs.72 In other words, utilities may now begin
recovery of qualified expenses through a RAC proceeding as soon
as a new project or program is approved, and may update and ad-
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(5) (Supp. 2014).
67. See id.; AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 5.
68. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 3.
69. See id.
70. See id.; see also Norfolk v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 192 Va. 292,
301-02, 64 S.E.2d 772, 777-78 (1951) ("[The SCC] must... determine upon and set the
percentage rate of return at such a figure as will afford the utility reasonable opportunity
to earn a fair and just return on its investment.").
71. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 3-5.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(5) (Supp. 2014).
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just the cost recovery as often as once every twelve months." This
means that utilities can reduce "regulatory lag," which is the time
period between when a utility first makes an investment (such as
when it starts construction of a power plant) and when the utility
may begin to recover those costs through rates.7 4 Under tradition-
al Chapter 10 regulation and before the RAC provisions were en-
acted, utilities could recover costs of a new generation facility on-
ly through base rates and generally could only begin to recover
the cost of the investment and earn a return once the facility be-
*75gan commercial operation.
In short, the RAC provisions established under the 2007 Act
provide powerful incentives for utilities to undertake capital pro-
jects that may be recovered through RACs, such as the construc-
tion of new power plants, since full cost recovery is guaranteed.
RACs also minimize risk to the utility's shareholders that any
prudently incurred costs will not be recovered by the utility.
C. Incentives for Construction of New Generation Facilities
In addition to its RAC provisions, the 2007 Act also contained
other incentives and bonuses for Virginia utilities to construct
new power generation facilities. Virginia Code section 56-
585.1(A)(6), as originally enacted, contained numerous rate-of-
return bonuses or "adders" designed to encourage utilities to con-
struct new power generation facilities." For example, this provi-
sion originally authorized rate of return bonuses of between 100
and 200 basis points (i.e., 1.0% and 2.0%) for numerous types of
generation facilities, including nuclear, renewable-powered, com-
bined cycle, and even conventional coal-fired power plants." The
73. Id.
74. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 5; see also Seth W.
Norton, In Search of Regulatory Lag, 26 Q. J. OF Bus. & ECON. 3, 3-4 (1987) (discussing
regulatory lag for regulated utilities).
75. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 5.
76. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts 2402, 2415-16 (codified at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2007)); Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 933, Va. Acts 2614, 2628-
29 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2007)). The 2013 General As-
sembly, as discussed below, removed the rate of return bonuses for all generating types
except for nuclear facilities and offshore wind construction projects. Act of Feb. 14, 2013,
ch. 2, 2013 Va. Acts 2, 6 (codified as amended at VA. CODE. ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp.
2014)).
77. Ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts 2402, 2415-16; Ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts 2614, 2628-29.
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adders were to be applied to all equity capital and financing costs
of a facility for a term of years set by the SCC." The length of
time that the adders were to apply depended on several factors,
including the SCC's opinion regarding how "critical" the facility
was to meeting the energy needs of the Commonwealth."
These basis points adders certainly incentivize the construction
of new generation plants because they provide utility sharehold-
ers with additional profits." But in so doing, the adders also in-
crease the cost of particular projects, thus raising rates for cus-
tomers." Pursuant to the 2007 Act, Virginia utilities are, by law,
guaranteed full cost recovery from customers of all costs neces-
sary to construct and operate a new power plant." Additionally,
the 2007 Act guarantees utilities to recover a fair rate of return
that is applied to all costs of the generation facility, plus a rate of
return bonus to be applied to the costs of the generation facility
on top of the utility's fair rate of return."
For example, when Dominion received approval to construct a
new natural gas combined cycle power plant in Brunswick Coun-
ty in 2013, the company was allowed to design its rates at a level
that would guarantee full recovery of the $1.27 billion in costs
necessary to construct the generation facility and related trans-
mission infrastructure, plus a fair rate of return, plus a bonus
applied to the general rate of return." The SCC determined Do-
minion's fair rate of return to be 10.4% in its 2011 biennial re-
view," and the rate of return bonus authorized by subsection
78. Ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts, 2402, 2415-16; ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts 2614, 262&-29.
79. Ch. 888, 2007 Va. Acts, 2402, 2415-16; ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts 2614, 2628-29.
80. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2014); see AG ROE ENHANCEMENT
ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 21; see also id. at 44 ('These adders, or surcharges,....
transfer an enormous amount of money from millions of individuals and businesses in the
Commonwealth to utility companies and their shareholders . . . ").
81. For example, the subsection (A)(6) rate of return adder applied to Dominion's
Brunswick Power Station in Brunswick County, Virginia, is estimated to increase costs to
customers by over $76 million. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at
32-33. A hypothetical new nuclear facility, using a conservation construction cost estimate
of $10 billion, would increase total capital costs to customers by over $1.8 billion. Id.
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2014).
83. Id.
84. See id.; AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 32.
85. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For a 2011 Biennial Review of the Rates,
Terms, and Conditions for the Provision of Generation, Distribution, and Transmission
Services Pursuant to § 56.585.1 A of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00027, 2011 Va. PUC
LEXIS 991, Final Order at *32-33 (Nov. 30, 2011).
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(A)(6) for combined cycle power plants was 100 basis points, or
1%." Therefore, Dominion was authorized to recover from cus-
tomers an ROE of 11.4% (after tax) applied to the full construc-
tion costs of the facility." The Attorney General's Office estimated
that the cost increase attributable to the generation bonus for the
Brunswick facility alone will be more than $76 million."
D. Promoting Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency
The 2007 Act also sought, at least ostensibly, to promote the
development of clean energy resources in the Commonwealth." It
included several provisions intended to incentivize the construc-
tion of renewable energy generation facilities and to provide air
quality and environmental benefits."o
1. Voluntary Renewable Portfolio Standard Goals
The 2007 Act contained a voluntary renewable portfolio stand-
ard ("RPS"), which sought to promote the development of clean
energy resources in the Commonwealth." An RPS, sometimes re-
ferred to as a renewable energy standard, requires utilities to ob-
tain a certain percentage of their electricity sales from renewable
energy sources, such as solar, wind, biomass, or hydroelectric
power facilities." Over thirty states and the District of Columbia
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2014); see Application of Va. Elec. & Power
Co., For Approval and Certification of the Proposed Brunswick County Power Station and
Related Transmission Facilities Pursuant to ff 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code
of Virginia, and for Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause, Designated Rider BW, Pursu-
ant to § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2012-00128, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 761,
Final Order at *30 (Aug. 2. 2013).
87. The SCC also determined that the rate of return bonus should be applied to costs
of new transmission lines necessary to carry energy from the power plant to the broader
electric grid. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed this decision on September 12, 2014.
Office of Att'y Gen. v. State Corp. Comm'n, Nos. 131872, 131873, slip op. at 17 (Va. Sept.
12, 2014).
88. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 33.
89. See id. at i.
90. See id.; see also, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2007) (incentiviz-
ing the construction of renewable energy generation facilities).
91. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at i, 6.
92. Id. at 6; see Ivan Gold & Nidhi Thakar, A Survey of State Renewable Portfolio
Standards: Square Pegs for Round Climate Change Holes?, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 183, 185-86 (2010).
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have enacted some form of an RPS." The requirements and strin-
gency of state RPS laws vary significantly. California, for exam-
ple, has a very robust RPS, requiring utilities to obtain 33% of
their energy sales from renewable sources by 2020.94 North Caro-
lina, meanwhile, only requires utilities to meet a goal of 12.5% by
202 1. As originally enacted, the annual percentage goals found
in Virginia's RPS gradually increase from 4% of the energy sold
by a utility in 2007 to 15% by 2022.96 Participating utilities are al-
lowed to sell any renewable energy certificates ("RECs")"7 for pur-
poses of RPS compliance." Participating utilities may also sell
RECs produced at their own facilities or acquired as part of a
purchase power agreement.99
While most RPS laws are mandatory, Virginia's RPS contains
voluntary renewable energy goals. 00 As such, Virginia's two larg-
est utilities may, but are not required to, participate in the RPS
program.' But the General Assembly, through the 2007 Act, in-
cluded various incentives for APCo and Dominion to do so. First,
93. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 11; see also Steven
Ferrey, Follow the Money! Article I and Article VI Constitutional Barriers to Renewable
Energy in the U.S. Future, 17 VA. J.L. & TECH. 92, 97 (2012).
94. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.11 (Deering 2014); California Renewable Portfolio
Standard (RPS), CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewa
bles/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8 (2013).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(D) (Repl. Vol. 2007). In calculating the energy sales in
2007, however, the Code excluded nuclear generation. Id. § 56-585.2(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
In other words, when determining how much energy was sold by a utility in 2007, nuclear
generation was subtracted from the total. Id. Therefore, a utility such as Dominion that
obtains a significant portion of its energy sales from nuclear power sources had its annual
RPS target lowered accordingly. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note
30, at 13 & n.32; see also Nuclear Energy, DOMINION, https://www.dom.comlabout/environ
ment/report/nuclear-energy.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) (stating that Dominion nuclear
stations provide for roughly one-third of the power in Virginia).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(A) (Supp. 2014). RECs represent the environmental at-
tributes of renewable generation and may be bought and sold as commodities that are
separate from the underlying renewable generation. Id. § 56-585.2(D), (F), (J)(4) (Supp.
2014).
98. See id. § 56-585.2(D) (Supp. 2014). Most states allow utilities to use RECs for
compliance with RPS goals. U.S. P'SHIP FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., RAMPING UP
RENEWABLES: LEVERAGING STATE RPS PROGRAMS AMID UNCERTAIN FEDERAL SUPPORT 18,
available at https://www.db.com/cr/en/does/Ramping-upRenewables-Leveraging-State-
RPSProgramsamidUncertainFederalSupport.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(F) (Supp. 2014).
100. Id. § 56-585.2(B) (Supp. 2014); AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra
note 30, at 11-12.
101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(B) (Supp. 2014).
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utilities may recover all RPS program expenses through an "RPS
RAC" authorized by Virginia Code section 56-585.1(A)(5)(d).102
Therefore, the ability to recover all expenses incurred to comply
with the RPS goals is guaranteed.' 8 Further, under its 2012
amendment, section 56-585.2 authorized a rate of return adder or
bonus of 0.5% to be applied to a utility's general rate of return if
the utility could demonstrate that it satisfied the renewable ener-
gy targets for the particular year.o' In other words, if a utility
was authorized to recover an ROE of 10%, the authorized rate of
return would be increased to 10.5% if the utility satisfied its RPS
goals.'5 Thus, if a utility could demonstrate that it was able to
comply with the RPS goals, its shareholders would reap addition-
al profits from the utility's ratepayers. APCo and Dominion have
both participated in Virginia's RPS program thus far, and both
utilities have complied with their annual goals.' 6 In their 2011
rate cases, the RPS bonus resulted in annual revenue require-
ment increase of $7.75 million for APCo and $38.5 million for
Dominion. 0 7
Virginia's RPS does not require Virginia utilities to build any
new renewable generation facilities. Instead, Virginia utilities
may purchase RECs from out-of-state renewable facilities in or-
der to satisfy the goals.'a Many stakeholders, including former
Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli and several environmental or-
102. Id. § 56-585.1(A)(5)(d) (Supp. 2014).
103. Id.; id. § 56-585.2(E) (Supp. 2014).
104. Id. § 56-585.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012). The General Assembly removed this incentive
in 2013. See id. § 56-585.2(C) (Supp. 2014).
105. Unlike the rate of return bonus applied to generation construction projects, which
is applied only to generation costs, see supra text accompanying note 83, the fifty basis
points adder for meeting the utility's RPS goals was applied to the utility's entire rate
base. Id. § 56-585.2(C) (Repl. Vol. 2012); see AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, su-
pra note 30, at 7.
106. See, e.g., Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For a 2011 Biennial Review of the
Rates, Terms, and Conditions for the Provision of Generation, Distribution, and Transmis-
sion Services Pursuant to § 56.585.1 A of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00027, 2011 Va.
PUC LEXIS 991, Final Order at *39-40 (Nov. 30, 2011) ("[Dominion] has met RPS Goals
such that it is statutorily entitled to the RPS Performance Incentive under [section 56-
585.2(C)], which requires the Commission to increase the Company's fair combined rate of
return on common equity by an additional 50 basis points."); Application of Appalachian
Power Co., For a 2011 Biennial Review of the Rates, Terms and Conditions for the Provi-
sion of Generation, Distribution and Transmission Services Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A of the
Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00037, Final Order at 8-9 (Nov. 30, 2011), available at
http://docket.sec.virginia.gov/vaprod/main.asp.
107. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 7.
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(F) (Supp. 2014).
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ganizations, have criticized Virginia's RPS, suggesting that the
costs to consumers were significant, while the environmental
benefits were minimal or non-existent."o' As a result, as described
below, the 2013 General Assembly modified, but did not elimi-
nate, Virginia's voluntary RPS."0o
2. Energy Efficiency Goals
The General Assembly, in the enactment clause to the 2007
Act, stated that it is in the public interest "to promote cost-
effective conservation of energy through fair and effective de-
mand side management, conservation, energy efficiency, and load
management programs, including consumer education.""' The
General Assembly also established an energy efficiency target of
10% by 2022, directing that "[tlhe Commonwealth shall have a
stated goal of reducing the consumption of electric energy by re-
tail customers through the implementation of [energy efficiency]
programs by the year 2022 by an amount equal to ten percent of
the amount of electric energy consumed by retail customers in
2006."112 After setting this target, the General Assembly directed
the SCC to evaluate whether achieving the 10% energy reduction
target was feasible in Virginia."' The SCC ultimately concluded
that the 10% energy reduction goal was in fact achievable in the
time frame established by the General Assembly."'
The legislation does not speak to how the 10% energy reduction
goal should be achieved, but one option is utility-sponsored ener-
gy efficiency programs."' Dominion, for example, has received ap-
proval to offer residential and commercial customers numerous
incentives intended to encourage energy conservation, such as re-
bates for energy efficient lighting and appliance rebate pro-
109. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at i, 21.
110. Act of Feb. 14, 2013, ch. 2, 2013 Va. Acts 2, 9-11 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-585.2 (Supp. 2014)).
111. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts 2614, 2636 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 56-576 to -594 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2014)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STAFF'S REPORT TO THE STATE CORPORATION
COMMISSION IN PREPARATION FOR THE COMMISSION'S REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 10 (2007), available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/pue/conserve/staff/
staf-rept111607.pdf.
115. Ch. 933, 2007 Va. Acts 2614, 2636.
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grams."' Utilities obviously have no natural incentive to encour-
age their customers to conserve energy, which of course reduces
the sale of their product-electricity."7 In an attempt to mitigate
this disincentive to support energy efficiency, utilities are, under
the 2007 scheme, authorized to recover the cost of energy efficien-
cy programs from customers through RACs." The 2007 Act au-
thorizes utilities that implement energy efficiency programs to
recover "lost revenues" attributable to the energy sales that were
lost due to the implementation of such programs."' APCo has not
yet implemented any energy efficiency programs in Virginia, but
has sought to do so in a recent filing with the SCC. 20
3. Net Metering
Finally, the 2007 Act established a "net metering" option for
Dominion and APCo customers. 2' Net metering provides an eco-
nomic incentive for customers to install renewable energy devices
on their property, such as rooftop solar facilities, which can offset
their utility-supplied generation. 2 2 A net metering customer re-
mains connected to the utility's distribution system, and can uti-
lize utility-supplied power if the renewable devices do not provide
enough generation to meet the customer's need.'23 Alternatively, if
the customer's renewable device produces more electricity than
the customer consumes, he or she can deliver the excess electrici-
116. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval to Implement New De-
mand-Side Management Programs and for Approval of Two Rate Adjustment Clauses Pur-
suant to § 56-585.1 A 5 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2009-00081, 2010 Va. PUC LEXIS
172, Order Approving Demand-Side Management Programs at *11 (Mar. 24, 2010).
117. See Jeff D. Makholm, "Decoupling" for Energy Distributors: Changing 19th Centu-
ry Tariff Structures to Address 21st Century Energy Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 157, 158
(2008).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(5)(c) (Supp. 2014).
119. Id. ("[Tihe Commission, if requested by the utility, shall allow for the recovery of
revenue reductions related to energy efficiency programs ... that are directly attributable
to energy efficiency programs.").
120. See Application of Appalachian Power Co., For a 2014 Biennial Review of the
Rates, Terms and Conditions for the Provision of Generation, Distribution and Transmis-
sion Services Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2014-00026, 2014 Va.
PUC LEXIS 237, Order for Notice and Hearing at *6 (Apr. 8, 2014).
121. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-594 (Supp. 2014).
122. See Net Metering, DOMINION, https://www.dom.com/about/stations/renewable/net-
metering.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014); see also Kyle Weismantle, Building a Better Solar
Energy Framework, 26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 221, 223 (2014) ("[Sjolar ... technology can be
encouraged at the state and local level through ... net metering policies.").
123. See Net Metering, supra note 122.
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ty to the utility's grid and receive credit for doing so.124 As such,
net metering customers only pay for the "net" power they con-
sume.125 Net metering customers, in addition to offsetting all or
part of their energy usage, have the ability to sell the RECs gen-
erated from their renewable energy devices."' The ability to sell
RECs, along with various federal tax incentives, provides custom-
ers with an additional incentive to install renewable energy de-
vices at their homes or businesses. 2 7
The 2007 Act established caps on the allowable size, in kilo-
watts ("kW"), of net metering facilities in Virginia.128 Residential
renewable facilities were originally capped at 10 kW, while com-
mercial and industrial facilities were capped at 500 kW.12 Virgin-
ia Code section 56-594(E) also provides that total net metering in
a utility's service territory may not exceed 1% of the utility's peak
load from the previous year.' Presumably, the caps were intend-
ed to limit the amount of kWh sales that would be lost by the util-
ities to customer-owned net metering facilities.
III. AMENDMENTS AND ADJUSTMENTS TO THE 2007 ACT
Several aspects of the 2007 Act have been modified by the Gen-
eral Assembly in recent years. Most significantly, the 2013 Gen-
eral Assembly removed the rate of return bonuses awarded to
utilities for complying with Virginia's voluntary RPS and for most
new generation projects. 3'
124. See id.; Weismantle, supra note 122, at 224.
125. Net Metering, supra note 122.
126. Virginia: Net Metering, DATABASE FOR STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY, http://dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?IncentiveCode=VAO2R (last up-
dated July 2, 2014); see NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., THE ROLE OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY CERTIFICATES IN DEVELOPING NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS 1 (2011).
127. See Weismantle, supra note 122, at 223-24.
128. Act of Apr. 4, 2007, ch. 877, 2007 Va. Acts 2385, 2386-87 (codified as amended at
VA. CODE ANN. § 56-594 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
129. Id.
130. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-594(E) (Supp. 2014) ("The net metering standard contract or
tariff shall be available to eligible customer-generators or eligible agricultural customer-
generators on a first-come, first-served basis in each electric distribution company's Vir-
ginia service area until the rated generating capacity owned and operated by eligible cus-
tomer-generators or eligible agricultural customer-generators in the state reaches one per-
cent of each electric distribution company's adjusted Virginia peak-load forecast for the
previous year .... ).
131. See Act of Feb. 14, 2013, ch. 2, 2013 Va. Acts 2, 3, 5-6 (codified as amended at VA.
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A. Removal of ROE Adders for Certain Types of Generation
Facilities and for Compliance with Virginia's Voluntary
Renewable Portfolio Standard Goals
In 2013, the General Assembly removed the fifty basis points
rate of return bonus for compliance with RPS goals entirely.32
This legislation, stripping the RPS bonus from the 2007 Act, was
part of a compromise among stakeholders, including the two elec-
tric utilities subject to the 2007 Act-APCo and Dominion-and
the Attorney General's Office.' 3 The Attorney General's Office
recommended in a 2012 report to the General Assembly that all of
the rate of return bonuses for new generation facilities and for
compliance with the RPS goals and for compliance with the RPS
goals should be removed from the 2007 Act.'3 The General As-
sembly, however, chose to retain the bonuses for new nuclear and
offshore wind facilities. 3 ' As amended, a Virginia utility that con-
structs a new nuclear or offshore wind facility will receive a 100
basis points (i.e., 1%) rate of return adder to be applied on top of
the utility's general rate of return.'36 Moreover, all eligible gener-
ation projects approved prior to the law change will retain their
bonus adders.' For example, a basis points adder will still be ap-
plied to Dominion's Brunswick County Power Station, approved
by the SCC in August of 2013, because the utility's application for
approval to build this facility was pending at the time the legisla-
tion was enacted. 38
The 2013 General Assembly also removed the rate of return
bonus of fifty basis points granted to each utility for achieving its
annual RPS goals. " In other words, utilities may no longer re-
CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (Supp. 2014)).
132. Id. at 10.
133. See Kenric Ward, VA Environmentalists on 'Green' Credits-Mend Them, Don't
End Them, WATCHDOG.ORG VA. BUREAU (Dec. 17, 2012, 1:31 PM), http://watchdog.org/64
719/va-environmentalists-on-green-credits-mend-them-dont-end-them/.
134. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 44.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2014).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval and Certification of the
Proposed Brunswick County Power Station and Related Transmission Facilities Pursuant
to §f 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia, and for Approval of a Rate
Adjustment Clause, Designated Rider BW, Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Vir-
ginia, PUE-2012-00128, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 813, Final Order at *30 (Aug. 2, 2013).
139. Act of Feb. 14, 2013, ch. 2, 2013 Va. Acts 2, 10 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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ceive a fifty basis points rate of return bonus to be applied to the
utility's entire rate base for meeting the RPS goals.'40 The General
Assembly did not, however, repeal Virginia's voluntary RPS; util-
ities may still participate in the program and may still recover all
prudently incurred costs necessary for compliance.141 Further,
there is no indication that either APCo or Dominion intends to
abandon its participation in Virginia's voluntary RPS program,
even though the utilities will no longer receive a rate of return
bonus for doing so.
B. Additional Net Metering Options and "Standby" Charges
With regard to customer-owned renewable energy, the General
Assembly has made several adjustments to the net energy meter-
ing provisions of the 2007 Act. First, the 2011 General Assembly
raised the cap on residential energy facilities from 10 kW to 20
kW, thus allowing larger and more renewable energy systems to
be included in the program. 4 2 But the General Assembly also au-
thorized utilities to seek "standby" charges from customers with
facilities larger than 10 kW. 4 3 Because net metering customers
remain connected to the grid and may utilize a utility's electricity
when their own facilities are not producing energy, utilities want
these customers to "chip in" for the maintenance of the utility's
transmission and distribution system.'44 As Dominion has argued,
net metering customers "still require electricity from Dominion
when their own systems are not available," and a standby charge
"covers the cost of Dominion's wires and equipment, which would
be on standby for when these large alternative systems don't pro-
vide all the homeowner's power."14
ANN. § 56-585.2 (Supp. 2014)).
140. Id.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(E) (Supp. 2014).
142. Act of Mar. 18, 2011, ch. 239, 2011 Va. Acts 367, 367 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 56-594 (Supp. 2014)).
143. Ch. 239, 2011 Va. Acts 367, 368.
144. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of a Standby Charge and
Methodology and Revisions to its Tariff and Terms and Conditions of Service Pursuant to §
56-594 F of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00088, 2011 Va. PUC LEXIS 901, Final Order
at *5 (Nov. 23, 2011).
145. Frequently Asked Questions on Standby Charge, DOMINION, https://www.dom.com/
dominion-virginia-power/customer-service/rates-and-tariffs/pdflfaq-standby-charge.pdf
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
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In a 2011 order, the SCC set a standby rate for Dominion.146
The SCC established a standby charge of $4.19 for each kW of in-
stalled capacity to compensate Dominion for its investments in
transmission and distribution assets.4  Accordingly, a net meter-
ing residential customer with a 10 kW solar installation would be
required to pay Dominion a monthly standby charge of $41.90.
APCo is also currently seeking approval for its own standby rate
to be applied to customer-owned renewable energy facilities with
a capacity of 10 kW or greater.x1s
The proper calculation of the rate and the policy implications of
standby charges have been the subject of controversy. Some envi-
ronmental advocates, for example, have argued that residential
solar facilities actually benefit utilities, and the electric system as
a whole, due to the nature of solar generation.149 Because the peak
output of solar facilities often corresponds with the hottest days
of the year, and thus, the utilities' "peak demand," solar facilities
may provide value to the electric system by reducing the utilities'
need to purchase excess energy or ramp up more expensive power
plants.' Some advocates have also argued that increased emis-
sions-free renewable energy provides environmental benefits and,
therefore, should not be discouraged by standby charges.
In 2013, the General Assembly also expanded the net metering
provisions to allow certain farms and other agricultural business-
es to participate in net metering, provided that their energy facil-
ities were no larger than 500 kW."' This change will encourage
146. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., 2011 Va. PUC LEXIS 901, Final Order
at *3-5.
147. Id. at *2 ("The Company seeks approval of a standby charge consisting of a $2.79
per kilowatt distribution-related component, a $1.40 per kilowatt transmission-related
component, and a $0.00 kilowatt generation-related 'placeholder' component.").
148. Application of Appalachian Power Co., For a Biennial Review of the Rates, Terms
and Conditions for the Provision of Generation, Distribution and Transmission Services
Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2014-00026, 2014 Va. PUC LEXIS
237, Order for Notice and Hearing at *3 (Apr. 8, 2014).
149. See, e.g., Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of a Standby Charge
and Methodology and Revisions to Its Tariff Terms and Conditions of Service Pursuant to §
56-594 (F) of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00088, Comments of Interstate Renewable
Energy Council, at 5 (Oct. 27, 2011).
150. See id. at 3-5.
151. See, e.g., Sean Casten, Rebuttal: How Far We Have to Go, 16 ELEC. J. 81, 84
(2003).
152. Act of Mar. 13, 2013, ch. 268, 2013 Va. Acts 460 (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-594 (Supp. 2014)).
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larger-scale agricultural renewable energy operations in the
Commonwealth.
C. Encouraging Distributed Solar Generation and Energy
Efficiency
In addition to expanding net metering by raising the cap on
system size, the 2011 General Assembly enacted a law, Chapter
771 of the 2011 Acts of Assembly, designed to encourage utilities
to make investments in distributed solar generation.'" Unlike
large power plants, "distributed generation" refers to smaller
power generation facilities that are distributed throughout a util-
ity's service territory.'5 4 Distributed generation facilities are often
owned by customers, not the utility."' The General Assembly pro-
vided:
[t]hat in order to promote solar energy through distributed genera-
tion, the State Corporation Commission shall exercise its existing
authority to consider for approval . .. petitions filed by a utility to
construct and operate distributed solar generation facilities .. . with
an aggregate amount of rated generating capacity of up to 0.20 per-
cent of each electric utility's adjusted Virginia peak load for the cal-
endar year 2010.156
The legislation further directed the SCC to approve such pro-
grams, provided that it found that they were "reasonably de-
signed to be in furtherance of the public interest.""'
Chapter 771 also authorized utilities to establish "feed-in tar-
iffs" for solar energy "as alternatives to net energy metering." 5 A
feed-in tariff is an agreement that requires a utility to purchase
the output of renewable energy generated by a customer."5 While
153. See Act of Apr. 6, 2011, ch. 771, 2011 Va. Acts 1278, 1278.
154. See Distributed Generation, VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, http://www.deq.virgin
ia.gov/Programs/PollutionPrevention/VirginialnformationSourceforEnergy/DistributedGen
eration.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
155. See John V. Hurd, Note, The Great Standby Rate Debate: Analysis of a Key Barrier
to the Influx of Needed New Alternative Energy Sources, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 939, 939-
40 (2009).
156. Ch. 771, 2011 Va. Acts at 1278.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Feed-In Tariff: A Policy Tool Encouraging Deployment of Renewable Electricity
Technologies, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 30, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinener
gy/detail.cfm?id=11471 ("A [feed-in tariff] program typically guarantees that customers
who own a [feed-in-tariff|-eligible renewable electricity generation facility, such as a roof-
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net metering offsets all or a portion of a customer's usage,"' cus-
tomers participating in a feed-in tariff program purchase all of
their energy from their incumbent electric utility in exchange for
the fixed price the utility pays for the electricity the customer
provides to the grid."' Moreover, under a feed-in tariff program,
customer-generators typically do not retain the rights to any
RECs generated by their facilities.'62
Thus far, only Dominion has requested SCC approval to im-
plement any distributed solar programs pursuant to Chapter 771.
In 2012, Dominion received SCC approval to construct and oper-
ate up to 30 megawatt ("MW') of distributed solar at various roof-
top installations throughout its service territory."' The SCC spec-
ified that the utility may not charge customers more than $80
million for the project.'6 4 Dominion also received approval to im-
plement a feed-in tariff program designed to facilitate up to 3 MW
of solar generation from its residential customer class.'
D. Accounting Changes for Nuclear and Offshore Wind
Development Costs
In 2014, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 459, a con-
troversial change to the base rate provision of Virginia Code sec-
tion 56-585.1, which adjusted how Dominion's nuclear develop-
ment expenditures would be accounted for in future biennial
top solar photovoltaic system, will receive a set price from their utility for all of the elec-
tricity they generate and provide to the grid.").
160. See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
161. Feed-In Tariff, supra note 159 ("[Feed-in tariff] programs are also similar to net
metering programs but differ significantly in one key aspect: the power generated by a
utility customer's system is compensated at a rate set by the [feed-in tariff] rather than
the retail electricity rate. This generation is treated independently from the customer's
own electricity use, which is billed at the utility's regular retail rates. In a net metering
program, a utility customer is effectively paid the retail rate for any generation that is fed
back into the grid.").
162. See Which Program Is Right for You?, DOMINION, https://www.dom.com/about/sta
tions/renewable/solar/pdflprogram-comparison-chart.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
163. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For approval of a Community Solar Power
Program and for Certification of Proposed Distributed Solar Generation Facilities Pursu-
ant to Chapter 771 of the 2011 Virginia Acts of Assembly and §§ 56-46.1 and 56-580 D of
the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00117, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 703, Order at *2, 24 (Nov.
28, 2012).
164. Id. at *10.
165. Petition of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of a Special Tariff to Facilitate
Customer-Owned Distributed Solar Generation Pursuant to Chapter 771 of the 2011 Vir-
ginia Acts of Assembly, PUE-2012-00064, Order at 1, 9 (Mar. 22, 2013).
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review proceedings."' Senate Bill 459 provided that 70% of the
costs of any development activities for a new nuclear facility in-
curred between July 1, 2007, and December 31, 2013, would be
applied to the utility's earnings calculation in its next biennial
review. " Because Dominion is the only utility in Virginia under-
taking any nuclear development activities,16 the legislation was
written solely for Dominion. Opponents of the bill, including the
Attorney General of Virginia, environmental groups, and various
industrial organizations, argued that the bill was simply a ma-
nipulation of Dominion's earnings, intended to shield the utility
from being deemed to have "over-earned" in its next base rate
case."' The SCC had projected that Dominion would have "over-
earned" by approximately $280 million during the company's next
earnings review, which, absent Senate Bill 459, would have trig-
gered rate credits for customers.7 o As The Washington Post re-
ported, "[b]y writing off 70 percent of the nearly $600 million that
Dominion says has been spent on nuclear and wind-power gener-
ation between 2007 and 2013, Dominion can avoid a possible re-
fund in 2015 and a rate cut in 2017.""' As such, the legislation ef-
fectively "let [Dominion] deduct about $400 million from its
profits and [will] probably avoid issu[ing a rate] refund to cus-
tomers the next time the [SCC reviews Dominion's balance
sheet].
The General Assembly's 2014 amendment also added language
to the 2007 Act, directing that "planning and development activi-
ties for a new nuclear generation facility or facilities are in the
public interest."'7 This language appears to encourage Dominion
166. S.B. 459, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2014) (enacted as Act of Apr. 3, 2014, ch.
541, 2014 Va. Acts _.-
167. Id.
168. See Peter Bacqu6, Proposed Utility Law Could Have Big Impact, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 2014, at Al (Apr. 19, 2014, 2:36 PM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/
business/energy/proposed-utility-law-could-have-big-impact/articleccl3dfaf-dd41-5dc9-84
6b-880e3ab0547a.html.
169. Rachel Weiner, Bill Passed by Va. Legislature May Help Dominion Power Avoid





173. Act of Apr. 3, 2014, ch. 541, 2014 Va. Acts _, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2014)).
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to continue with construction activities for a third nuclear unit at
its North Anna facility. 74
IV. EFFECTS OF THE 2007 ACT ON ELECTRIC RATES AND ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT IN VIRGINIA
A. Utility Rates of Return
The 2007 Act's effect on rates is unclear. The electric rates of
both Dominion and APCo have risen since 2007 but are not out of
line with national averages."' Some changes to total electric
rates, such as fluctuations in fuel costs, may have occurred inde-
pendently of the 2007 Act. But it appears that the rates of return
authorized by the SCC may have risen in some cases due to the
ROE floor provision contained in Virginia Code section 56-
585.1(A)(6). As discussed previously, the SCC, on at least one oc-
casion, has awarded a utility a rate of return greater than that
which it otherwise would have received due to the ROE floor con-
tained in section 56-585.1.176 Moreover, elevated ROEs granted to
Virginia utilities pursuant to the 2007 Act have caught the atten-
tion of national utility analysts. The Edison Electric Institute, for
example, reported that the average of utility ROEs jumped due to
the ROE increases in Virginia mandated by the Act."'
B. Construction of New Generation Facilities
The 2007 Act was undoubtedly intended to encourage Virginia
utilities to invest in new, utility-owned power generation facili-
ties."' In addition to RACs that guarantee the recovery of all con-
struction costs on a timely and current basis, the 2007 Act also
contained rate of return bonuses intended to incentivize the con-
174. See Bacqub, supra note 168.
175. See vA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRGINIA
ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION ACT app. 3 at 2 (2013), available at http://www.scc.virgin
ia.gov/comni/reports/2013_veur.pdf.
176. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
177. EDISON ELEC. INST., RATE CASE SUMMARY: Q1 2012 FINANCIAL UPDATE 1-2 (2012),
available at http://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedialindustrydataanalysis/industryfinancial
analysis/QtrlyFinancialUpdates/Documents/QFURateCase/2012_Q1_RateCase.pdf.
178. See Brian R. Greene & Katharine A. Hart, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Public
Utility Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 295, 303 (2008).
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struction of new generation facilities."' But while Dominion has
constructed numerous new generation facilities in Virginia over
the last several years, it is unclear what role, if any, the incen-
tives provided by the 2007 Act played in those investment deci-
sions."' In other words, it is unclear whether the rate of return
bonuses actually incentivized utilities to construct generation fa-
cilities that they would not have otherwise built--or whether the
bonuses simply rewarded utility shareholders with additional
profits.
1. Dominion
Dominion has received certificates of public convenience and
necessity ("CPCNs") pursuant to section 56-580(D) for eight new
generation facilities since the passage of the 2007 Act."'
179. Id. at 303-04; see supra Part II(C).
180. See AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 42.
181. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of Conversion and Opera-
tion of Bremo Power Station, PUE-2012-00101, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 633, Final Order at
*20 (Sept. 10, 2013) (natural gas); Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval and
Certification of the Proposed Brunswick County Power Station and Related Transmission
Facilities Pursuant to § 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia, and for
Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause, Designated Rider BW, Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 6 of
the Code of Virginia, PUE-2012-00128, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 813, Final Order at *34-35
(Aug. 2, 2013) (natural gas-fired combined cycle); Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For
Approval of a Community Solar Power Program and for Certification of Proposed Distrib-
uted Solar Generation Facilities Pursuant to Chapter 771 of the 2011 Virginia Acts of As-
sembly and §§ 56-46.1 and 56-580 D of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00117, 2012 Va.
PUC LEXIS 703, Order at *24 (Nov. 28, 2012) (solar); Applications of Va. Elec. & Power
Co., For Approval and Certification of the Proposed Biomass Conversion of the Altavista,
Hopewell, and Southampton Power Stations Under §§ 56-580 D and 56-46.1 of the Code of
Virginia and for Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause, Designated as Rider B, Under §
56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00073, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 255, Final
Order at *22 (Mar. 16, 2012) (biomass); Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval
and Certification of the Proposed Warren County Power Station Electric Generation and
Related Transmission Facilities Under ff 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code of
Virginia and for Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause, Designated as Rider W, Under §
56-585.1 A 6 of Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00042, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 8, Final Order at
*35-36 (Feb. 2, 2012) (natural gas-fired combined-cycle); Application of Va. Elec. & Power
Co., For a Certificate to Construct and Operate a Generating Facility; For Certificates of
Public Convenience and Necessity for a Transmission Line: Bear Garden Generating Sta-
tion and Bear Garden-Bremo 230 kV Transmission Interconnection Line, PUE-2008-00014,
2009 Va. PUC LEXIS 226, Final Order at *55 (Mar. 27, 2009) (combined cycle natural gas-
and oil-fired facility); Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For a Certificate of Public Con-
venience and Necessity to Construct and Operate an Electric Generation Facility in Wise
County, Virginia, and for Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause Under §f 56-585.1, 56-580
D, and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2007-00066, 2008 Va. PUC LEXIS 334, Final
Order at *49-50 (Mar. 31, 2008) (coal); Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co. & Dominion
2014] 163
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In 2008, Dominion began construction of a 600 MW, $1.8 billion
coal-fired power plant-the Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center
("Virginia City") facility, in Wise County, Virginia. 8 2 The 2007 Act
included a clause providing that it is "in the public interest" for
utilities to build "coal-fueled generation facilit[ies] that utilize[]
Virginia coal and [are] located in the coalfield region of the Com-
monwealth."'" While the SCC normally determines whether a
particular facility would be "in the public interest," the 2007 Act
effectively took this decision away from the SCC.8"' Indeed, the
SCC noted that it "has no discretion to make a separate public in-
terest determination" because the statute directed that such a fa-
cility was in the public interest."' The SCC approved a rate of re-
turn bonus of 100 basis points because Virginia City was a
"'conventional coal' plant" pursuant to section 56-585.1(A)(6). '8
Dominion has also received CPCNs to construct three natural
gas combined cycle facilities in Virginia-the Bear Garden,"
Warren County,"' and Brunswick County'89 power stations. Each
Wholesale, Inc., For Approval and Certification of Electric Generating Facilities Under §
56-580 D and § 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia and for Approval of Affiliate Transactions
Under Chapter 4, Title 56 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-2007-00032, 2007 Va. PUC LEXIS
742, Final Order at *10-11 (Aug. 24, 2007) (dual fuel gas- and oil-fired turbine generator
units).
182. Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center St. Paul, Va., MID-ATLANTIC CONSTR. (2009),
http://midatlantic.construction.com/features/archive/2009/summer09_flhybridenergycen
ter.asp. Virginia City is characterized as a "hybrid" because it is able to burn up to 20%
biomass for fuel. Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center, DOMINION, https://www.dom.com
/about/stations/fossil/virginia-city-hybrid-energy-center.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
183. VA. CODE. ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Repl. Vol. 2007).
184. See Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., 2008 Va. PUC LEXIS 334, Final Order
at *11-12.
185. Id. at *12.
186. Id. at *39.
187. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For a Certificate to Construct and Operate a
Generating Facility, for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for a Transmis-
sion Line: Bear Garden Generating Station and Bear Garden-Bremo 230 kV Transmission
Interconnection Line, PUE-2008-00014, 2009 Va. PUC LEXIS 226, Final Order at *55
(Mar. 27, 2009).
188. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval and Certification of the Pro-
posed Warren County Power Station Electric Generation and Related Transmission Facili-
ties Under ff 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia and for Approval of a
Rate Adjustment Clause, Designated as Rider W, Under § 56-585.1 A 6 of Code of Virginia,
PUE-2011-00042, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 8, Final Order at *35-36 (Feb. 2, 2012).
189. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval and Certification of the Pro-
posed Brunswick County Power Station and Related Transmission Facilities Pursuant to
§f 56-580 D, 56-265.2, and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia, and for Approval of a Rate Ad-
justment Clause, Designated Rider BW, Pursuant to § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia,
PUE-2012-00128, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 813, Final Order at *34-35 (Aug. 2, 2013).
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of these facilities received a rate of return bonus of 100 basis
points.' The Bear Garden power plant, a 590-MW combined cy-
cle facility, was completed in 2011 at a cost of over $600 million."'
The 1329-MW Warren County power plant was approved by the
SCC in 2011, at a cost of $1.1 billion and it is expected to enter
service in late 2014.192 Dominion estimates that the Warren Coun-
ty facility will produce enough electricity to power 325,000
homes." Finally, in 2013, the SCC granted approval for Domin-
ion to begin construction of a 1358-MW, $1.27 billion power plant
in Brunswick County, Virginia.19 4
In 2012, Dominion obtained CPCNs authorizing the company
to convert three small coal-fired power plants to burn biomass
fuel.' Dominion proposed to convert the three facilities in South-
ampton, Hopewell, and Altavista, Virginia, as a way to increase
the company's renewable energy capacity."' The estimated cost of
the three conversions was over $150 million, on which the SCC
awarded the 200 basis points statutory rate of return bonus.'
The facilities, which began generating power in late 2013, burn
190. See id. at *30; Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 8 at *26;
Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause for Recov-
ery of the Costs of the Bear Garden Generating Station and Bear Garden-Bremo 230 kV
Transmission Interconnection Line, PUE-2009-00017, 2009 Va. PUC LEXIS 279, Order for
Notice and Hearing at *3-4 (Apr. 21, 2009). Although the General Assembly removed the
rate of return adders for new natural gas combined-cycle facilities in 2013, Dominion filed
its applications to construct the facilities prior to the law change. See supra notes 137-38
and accompanying text.
191. Bear Garden Power Station, Dominion, http://www.dom.com/about/stations/fossil/
bear-garden-power-station.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
192. Peter Bacqu6, New Power Plant Approved in Warren; Resident Customers to Pay
About 65 Cents More Each Month, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH Feb. 3, 2012, D1.
193. Warren County Power Station, DOMINION, http://www.dom.com/about/stations/fos
sil/warren-county-power-station.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
194. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 813, Final Order at
*1-2, *34-35.
195. Applications of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval and Certification of the Pro-
posed Biomass Conversions of the Altavista, Hopewell, and Southampton Power Stations
Under §§ 56-580 D and 56-46.1 of the Code of Virginia and for Approval of a Rate Adjust-
ment Clause, Designated as Rider B, Under § 56-585.1 A 6 of the Code of Virginia, PUE-
2011-00073, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 255, Final Order at *1, 22 (Mar. 16, 2012).
196. Id. at *22.
197. Id. at *2. *18.
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wood waste, which qualifies as a renewable fuel under Virginia
law. '98
Finally, Dominion's only large-scale wind or solar construction
project undertaken to date is a distributed solar demonstration
project that will add approximately 30 MW of solar power to the
grid.'" Dominion was also the winning bidder in an auction for
the rights to develop wind resources on 112,800 acres of federal
land off the coast of Virginia.200 Dominion has estimated that the
land area could support up to 2000 MW of wind turbines. 20' Fur-
ther, although the company has not yet committed to building a
large-scale offshore wind farm, Dominion is going forward with a
demonstration project off the coast of Virginia, which will consist
of two 6-MW wind turbines.202 Dominion states that the project is
"intended to find ways to lower the cost of offshore wind genera-
tion and test technologies and equipment designed to withstand
hurricane force winds."202
2. APCo
Despite the ability to recover generation costs through a RAC
incorporating a rate of return bonus, APCo has not constructed,
nor announced plans to construct, any additional generation
plants since the passage of the 2007 Act. In 2012, however, APCo
did acquire a 580-MW natural gas combined cycle facility located
in Ohio. 204 Although APCo did not construct the Dresden power
plant, the utility was still authorized to receive a 100 basis points
198. Biomass Power, DOMINION, http://www.dom.com/about/stations/renewable/bioma
ss-stations.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014); see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(F) (Supp. 2014).
199. Application of Va. Elec. & Power Co., For Approval of a Community Solar Power
Program and for Certification of Proposed Distributed Solar Generation Facilities Pursu-
ant to Chapter 771 of the 2011 Virginia Acts of Assembly and §f 56-46.1 and 56-580 D of
the Code of Virginia, PUE-2011-00117, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 703, Order at *1-3, *24 (Nov.
28, 2012).
200. Offshore Wind Power, DOMINION, http://www.dom.comlabout/stations/renewable/
offshore-wind-power.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
201. Id.
202. Virginia Offshore Wind Technology Advancement Project, DOMINION, http://www.
dom.com/about/stations/renewable/vowtap.jsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
203. Id.
204. VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, STATUS REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VIRGINIA




rate of return bonus pursuant to section 56-585.1(A)(6). 205 Fur-
ther, APCo is converting two coal-fired units at its Clinch River
facility to burn natural gas. 206
In 2013, APCo sought to add to its capacity portfolio by re-
questing SCC approval to acquire interests in two coal-fired pow-
er plants in West Virginia.0 7 Specifically, APCo requested the
SCC's approval to acquire a two-thirds interest in the John E.
Amos power plant in Winfield, West Virginia, and a one-half in-
terest in the Mitchell facility in Moundsville, West Virginia.208
Several parties opposed the proposed acquisitions, including the
Attorney General's Division of Consumer Counsel.o The utility
proposed to purchase the coal units at a total cost of over $1.1 bil-
lion, which several parties argued was an excessive cost for old,
coal-fired facilities.210 The SCC ultimately rejected APCo's request
to acquire the interest in the Mitchell facility, but approved AP-
Co's acquisition of the remaining interest in the Amos facility.211
The SCC, in its rejection of APCo's request to acquire interests in
both coal units, referenced the "likelihood of increased federal
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from existing coal plants"
as a reason why APCo should not invest too heavily in additional
coal-fired capacity.212
205. Application of Appalachian Power Co., For Approval of a Rate Adjustment Clause:
Rider G, Dresden Generating Plant, PUE-2012-00036, 2012 Va. PUC LEXIS 798, Final
Order at *1, *8 (Dec. 20, 2012).
206. Application of Appalachian Power Co., For Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity to Convert Units 1 and 2 of the Clinch River Plant to Use Natural Gas Rather
Than Coal as Fuel, PUE-2013-00057, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 983, Final Order at *1, *12-13
(Dec. 20, 2013).
207. Application of Appalachian Power Co., For Approval of Transactions to Acquire
Interests in the Amos and Mitchell Generation Plants and to Merge with Wheeling Power
Company, PUE-2012-00141, 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 518, Order at *1-2 (July 31, 2013).
208. Id.
209. See id. at *5.
210. See, e.g., Application of Appalachian Power Co., For Approval of Transactions to
Acquire Interests in the Amos and Mitchell Generation Plants and to Merge With Wheeling
Power Company, PUE-2012-00141, Post-Hearing Brief of the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Division of Consumer Counsel at 43-44 (July 2, 2013), available at http://docket.
scc.virginia.gov/vaprod/main.asp.
211. Application of Appalachian Power Co., 2013 Va. PUC LEXIS 518, Order at *10.
212. Id. at*14.
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C. Clean Energy Development in the Commonwealth
1. Renewable Portfolio Standard
While Virginia utilities have met their annual renewable ener-
gy goals, Virginia's RPS has been responsible for little, if any, re-
newable energy development in the Commonwealth. A 2012 re-
port by the Office of the Attorney General found that
[t]he [RPS] adder has not served to advance the environmental con-
cerns that led to its inclusion in the Act because, by and large, [Vir-
ginia's] utilities have not built any new renewable facilities to com-
ply with the RPS goals, but instead, have primarily relied on
Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) from pre-existing renewable
facilities, including hydroelectric plants that have been in service for
more than 80 years.
Neither APCo nor Dominion has constructed a renewable energy
facility in order to satisfy the RPS goals.2 14 Instead, both utilities
have complied with their annual RPS goals primarily through
out-of-state REC purchases."' As of late 2012, Dominion did not
anticipate using any of the renewable energy generated at either
of its biomass energy facilities or its new solar energy facilities to
satisfy its RPS goals.216 Instead, those RECs would be sold to oth-
er utilities, and Dominion would use lower-cost RECs to satisfy
the RPS goals.21 ' Environmental advocates have criticized Virgin-
ia's largest electric utility, Dominion, for its lack of meaningful
investments in new renewable energy generation in Virginia.218
213. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at i. Then-Attorney Gen-
eral Cuccinelli also argued that the RPS adder is "outrageously expensive in relation to
what we get, which is nothing." Peter Bacqu6, Energy Law Costs Va. Power, APCo Cus-
tomers $1 Billion-Plus Too Much, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://
www.timesdispatch.com/news/energy-law-costs-va-power-apco-customers-billion-plus-too/
article_928e09b6-28d3-5eb6-88c6-d58b7eabed65.html.
214. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 15-17.
215. Id.
216. See id. at 16 n.42 (internal citation omitted). But see DOMINION, ANNUAL REPORT
TO THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ON RENEWABLE ENERGY 5 (2013), available at
http://www.dom.com/about/stations/renewable/pdf/renewable-energy-report-2013.pdf
("[Dominion] plans to use existing renewable energy sources ... to develop new renewable
energy generation facilities where feasible, and to purchase RECs to achieve the RPS
goals.").
217. AG ROE ENHANCEMENT ADDERS REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 n.42.
218. See, e.g., Ivy Main, Op-Ed., Dominion Power's Wind and Solar Fagade, WASH.




2. Energy Efficiency and Demand Response Savings
Although the 2007 Act expressed a 10% energy reduction goal
by 2022, Virginia has made relatively little progress towards that
goal.219 The American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy
claims that "Virginia has made legislative progress in energy effi-
ciency, however the implementation process has been difficult
and as a result the state still falls well below the national average
on energy efficiency program spending and energy savings."220
Since the enactment of the 2007 Act, Dominion has implemented
several efficiency programs designed to reduce energy consump-
tion by customers.22 1 However, Dominion forecasts that its exist-
ing efficiency programs will result in only a 4% reduction in ener-
gy usage in its service territory by 2028, well short of the General
Assembly's 10% target.222
CONCLUSION
It is not yet clear how the 2007 Act, or Virginia's decision to
abandon its move toward deregulation, has affected electric rates
or the development of new energy resources in Virginia. But as
the Commonwealth gains more experience with the 2007 Act,
more adjustments to the law seem likely. New environmental
regulations, including the Environmental Protection Agency's re-
cently proposed greenhouse gas rules,223 are also likely to impact
the regulation of energy in the Commonwealth. Therefore, if the
past is any predictor of the future, it appears there may be only
one constant in the future regulation of Virginia's electric utili-
ties: change.
219. Virginia Utility Policies, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., http://
www.aceee.org/sector/state-policy/virginia (last updated Nov. 8, 2013).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. This percentage is derived from Dominion's 2013 Integrated Resource Plan. See In
re Va. Elec. and Power Co.'s Integrated Resource Plan Filing Pursuant to § 56-597 et seq. of
the Code of Virginia, PUE-2013-00088, Integrated Resource Plan, at app. 2A, 5E (Aug. 30,
2013), available at http://docket.scc.virginia.gov/vaprod/main.asp.
223. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Elec-
tric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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